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INTRODUCTION
Across Kenya’s Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASALs), 
entire ecosystems are being transformed into community 
conservancies – spaces where transhumance pastoralism 
and biodiversity conservation are jointly pursued through 
collaborative, decentralised arrangements for managing 
communal lands and natural resources. The Northern 
Rangelands Trust (NRT) has spearheaded this transformation 
since its establishment in 2004. With access to the signiicant 
financial resources required to implement and operate 
community conservancies, the non-governmental organisation 
has worked to transform 3.2 million hectares across the ASALs 
into community conservancies (NRT 2015a). This process has 
brought some 250,000 people into decentralised conservation 
arrangements with NRT (NRT 2015a). As the scale and scope 
of NRT’s inluence expands, pastoralists’ access to communal 
lands and natural resources is increasingly being mediated 
by the organisation’s policies and programmes. This trend is 
occurring alongside other land deals for rural development 
across the region, which further impact the ability of pastoralist 
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communities to manage communal lands and natural resources 
for pastoralism (Enns 2017). 
Like other Community-Based Natural Resource Management 
(CBNRM) arrangements, community conservancies in 
Kenya’s ASALs are meant to give indigenous peoples or 
subsistence producers more control over how communal 
lands and natural resources are managed for conservation, and 
control over revenues derived from market-based approaches 
to conservation. ‘The central tenet of this scheme is that, in 
contrast to colonial-style “fortress conservation”, there should 
be no conlict between the economic survival of communities 
and foraging needs of wildlife; rather, they should complement 
each other’ (Wolmer and Ashley 2003: 32). The use of economic 
incentives (e.g. jointly-owned tourism ventures, payment for 
ecosystem services, or new sources of employment in the 
conservation industry) to condition rural communities to the 
environmentally friendly behaviours espoused by NRT relects 
the market-based or neoliberal nature of CBNRM (Dressler 
and Büscher 2008; Fletcher 2010; Roth and Dressler 2012). 
In short, market-based approaches to conservation ‘promise 
to reconcile the longstanding tension between livelihood 
and conservation’ (Roth and Dressler 2012: 363). Despite 
such lofty ideas and aspirations, critical researchers have 
problematised the contradicting outcomes associated with 
CBNRM in practice, with some seeing CBNRM as a form 
of green grabbing (see Green and Adams 2014). Given the 
vast literature documenting these contradicting outcomes, we 
avoid rehearsing debate about the good and bad of CBNRM 
in this article.
Instead, we contribute to recent debate about the differentiated 
impacts and variegated political reactions to land grabs (Hall 
et al. 2015), focusing speciically on green grabs or land deals 
made for conservation purposes (Fairhead et al. 2012). Critics 
of land grabs have recently come under ire for over-relying on 
stereotypes of ‘grabbers’ and ‘grabbees’ and for romanticising 
resistance by indigenous peoples or subsistence producers 
while downplaying a more complex and broader range of 
political reactions, including demands to be incorporated into 
land grabs on adverse terms (Borras and Franco 2013; Hall 
et al. 2015; Mamonova 2015). Such charges have sparked 
calls for a return to the question of agency in relation to land 
grabs, with the goal of documenting and better understanding 
political reactions that go beyond resistance (Hall et al. 2015). 
In contributing to recent debate about land grabs, this article 
shows how a critical institutionalist perspective offers nuanced 
insights into subtle ways that green grabs work in practice and 
into diffuse sources of power in green grabs.  
More speciically, this article adds further context and 
complexity to linear conceptions of power prevalent in wider 
debate on peoples’ experiences with and reactions to green 
grabs. Departing from the framing of land grabs as social 
phenomena enacted from above and reacted to from below 
(Hall et al. 2015), we show how green grabs occur subtly 
through the refurbishment and rearrangement of institutions 
governing communal lands and natural resources to align 
with the ideas and aspirations of CBNRM. Our analysis is 
informed by the concept of institutional bricolage, which 
refers to processes by which groups of individuals consciously 
and unconsciously participate in reshaping institutional 
arrangements for managing communal lands and natural 
resources based on whatever tools or resources are readily 
accessible to them – recognising that those resources and tools 
that are available depend on the life chances and lifeworlds 
of bricoleurs (Cleaver and De Koning 2015). Acknowledging 
the diverse roles that pastoralists and conservationists have 
played as bricoleurs across Kenya’s ASALs, we consider 
how and why seemingly adaptive, creative, and progressive 
institutional arrangements for managing communal lands and 
natural resources result in green grabs. 
Three assumptions about the interplay between institutions 
and power illuminate our analysis: 1) institutions are 
fashioned from tools and resources that are geographically 
and historically contingent and embedded in everyday 
life; 2) individual actions (e.g. adaptive responses, creative 
innovations, and everyday practices) and social structures 
(e.g. dominant discourses and policies, patterns of land 
distribution and tenure, and patriarchal forms of social 
organisation) interact to produce outcomes that are enabling 
for some while constraining for others; 3) semiotics derived 
from a variety of sources confer authority and legitimacy on 
institutions and the power relationships they embody (Cleaver 
2012). With this in mind, institutional arrangements formed 
through bricolage are entwined with micro-level power 
relationships in everyday life and historical patterns of access, 
accumulation, and domination in society at large. As such, 
highly respected, wealthier, and/or well-connected people are 
capable of drawing on discursive and material resources from 
different domains of action to shape institutional arrangements 
in their favour. Although everyone has the potential to act in 
ways that transform or maintain the status quo, such action 
occurs both consciously and non-consciously. It is in the non-
conscious realm where hegemonic discourses and material 
relationships inform peoples’ perceptions of what is just or 
unjust, and so shape the actions pursued in response. These 
assumptions about institutions and power help to explain why 
relatively poor or marginalised groups do not always resist 
unjust forms of social organisation or why they might pursue 
incorporation into new, but equally problematic, relationships. 
Ultimately, these assumptions inform our conclusion that 
community conservancies in Kenya’s ASALs represent 
contradictory institutional spaces animated by the promise of 
human adaptation but constrained by historically unequal and 
oppressive forms of social organisation.   
This article proceeds by bringing literature on green grabs 
(and CBNRM more broadly) into conversation with that 
on critical institutionalism. This section is meant to situate 
our analysis and discussion in relation to existing literature 
and to highlight our contribution to recent, relevant debate. 
Additional background information is then provided on the 
case study and research methods informing this article, before 
we begin to analyse speciic institutional arrangements for 
managing communal lands and natural resources in community 
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conservancies across Kenya’s ASALs. This section begins by 
providing additional contextual information about NRT and 
proceeds with an analysis of key institutions governing revenue 
distribution and use, rangeland access and use, and conservation 
enterprises in community conservancies – focusing on the 
outcomes bricoleurs associate with these arrangements in 
practice. In discussing our analysis, we return to the concept of 
bricolage to expound on the institutional workings of power in 
community conservancies. The concluding section summarises 
the article’s main contributions and relects on the implications 
of green grab by bricolage for wider debate.
CBNRM, GREEN GRABS, AND CRITICAL 
INSTITUTIONALISM
CBNRM and institutions 
CBNRM rose to prominence in Africa during the mid-1990s, 
although its roots trace back to colonial efforts to govern 
communal lands and natural resources indirectly through 
leadership structures already in place among rural communities 
(Roe et al. 2009). Today CBNRM is based on developing 
‘arrangements for the decentralised sustainable utilisation of 
wild resources’ (Wolmer and Ashley 2003: 31) by integrating 
the logics, markets, and values of conservation with existing 
natural resource management practices (Jones 2006; Igoe and 
Brockington 2007; Roth and Dressler 2012). In departing from 
coercive and exclusionary conservation models (e.g. fortress 
conservation) to pursue decentralised and more socially 
inclusive arrangements, CBNRM prioritises the adaptation 
of customary or informal institutions that embody in-depth 
knowledge of local ecosystems (Nelson and Agrawal 2008). 
The logic of this approach is that designing institutions tailored 
to existing arrangements for natural resource management 
promotes good governance and economic viability in the 
conservation industry (Booth 2012). 
From this perspective, CBNRM reveals the hybrid nature 
of governance: whether intentional or not, formal rules and 
practices invariably combine with customary norms and 
informal practices to produce institutions that reconcile the 
policy imperatives of donors and governments with the needs 
and realities of rural communities (Cleaver et al. 2013). As 
critical researchers in Africa have demonstrated, the priorities 
and practices of conservation have long been at odds with those 
of rural communities that depend on access to communal lands 
and natural resources for their subsistence and survival (see 
Neumann 1998). As an alternative to fortress conservation, 
CBNRM avoids forcefully excluding rural communities from 
protected areas or coercing them into modern livelihoods 
or formal institutional arrangements. Instead, it seeks to 
embed new conservation rules and practices into existing 
leadership structures, decision-making processes, and everyday 
interactions, and vice versa (Cleaver et al. 2013). In this regard, 
CBNRM relies on technologies of government that work 
to create certain types of subjects (Agrawal 2005; Fletcher 
2010, 2017) that contribute to the conservation of communal 
lands and natural resources through the daily reenactment of 
behaviours, ideas, and values that are commensurable with the 
conservation industry (Agrawal 2005). 
Many conservation policy-makers, practitioners, and 
researchers believe that getting institutional design right 
will lead to outcomes that are more democratic, inclusive, 
and economically viable than those associated with other 
conservation models (see NRT 2015b). However, a plethora 
of literature reveals just how challenging or unlikely it is for 
CBNRM to achieve such outcomes in practice (Brockington 
2004; Jones 2006; Igoe and Brockington 2007; Roth and 
Dressler 2012; Martin et al. 2013). For example, mechanisms 
for devolving authority over wildlife to local-level actors often 
fail to ensure democratic and transparent public decision-
making processes when transposed into diverse contexts and 
heterogenous communities (Agrawal and Gibson 1999; West 
2006; Wright 2017). Moreover, the pursuit of economically 
viable conservation programmes tends to involve the 
commodiication and privatisation/marketisation of communal 
lands and natural resources  processes that institutionalise new 
forms of exclusion, relationships of authority, and mechanisms 
for valuing natural resources that contradict the very ideas 
and aspirations of CBNRM (Songorwa 1999; Alexander 
and McGregor 2000; Igoe and Croucher 2007; Ojeda 2012; 
Wright 2017). For such reasons, many CBNRM arrangements 
bear the hallmark of green grabs: ‘the appropriation of land 
and resources for environmental ends’ (Fairhead et al. 2012: 
238). Indeed, this article builds on recent critical engagement 
with NRT policies and programmes by reframing community 
conservancies as green grabs (see Greiner 2012; Mbaria and 
Ogada 2016; German et al. 2017; Bersaglio 2017).
CBNRM and green grabbing
As a type of land grab justiied in the name of conservation, 
green grab implies the transfer of control over communal lands 
and natural resources ‘from the poor (or everyone including 
the poor) into the hands of the powerful (Fairhead et al. 2012: 
238), generally speaking. Beyond gaining access to communal 
lands and natural resources, green grabbers (e.g. multi-national 
companies; transnational conservation organisations; national 
and international investors; and local elites like landowners, 
public stakeholders, and customary leaders) reinvest revenues 
generated by market-based approaches to conservation into 
programmes and ventures with the effect of intensifying 
their control over land, resources, and capital in rural society. 
It has been shown that related processes of commodifying 
and privatising/marketising communal lands and natural 
resources invariably privilege the interests of a minority of 
the population, especially already powerful actors (Igoe and 
Brockington 2007).
In this regard, green grabs are akin to primitive accumulation 
or accumulation by dispossession (Kelly 2011; Benjaminsen 
and Bryceson 2012; Green and Adams 2015). Marx (1976) 
originally used primitive accumulation to describe the 
appropriation and enclosure of common property in Great 
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Britain, in which subsistence producers were divorced from the 
means of production through the institutionalisation and violent 
reinforcement of private property. This process transformed 
subsistence producers into wage labourers and the social 
means of production into capitalist relationships (Thompson 
1975). Yet primitive accumulation is not a one-time thing; 
it is a basic ontological condition of capitalism (Luxemburg 
1951; De Angelis 2001; Glassman 2006). The evolution and 
expansion of capitalism requires ongoing forms of primitive 
accumulation to forge new spaces (literal and igurative) for 
capital accumulation (Prudham 2013), processes Harvey 
(2003) reframed as accumulation by dispossession. As a form 
of green grab, CBNRM entails far more than changes as to how 
land is held, by who, and for what purposes. Such arrangements 
‘“pull resource users into new market economies” and at the 
same time relieve local people of their land and/or resources 
while forcing them to become dependent on an industry (often 
ecotourism) over which they have no control and from which 
they often earn very little money’ (Dressler and Büscher 2008: 
454–455, as cited in Kelly 2011: 686).  
The negative effects of green grabs around the world have 
been well-documented by critical researchers. In carrying out 
this work, however, the same researchers have been charged 
with proliferating stereotypical representations of ‘grabbers’ 
and ‘grabbees’. These charges target land grabbing literature 
broadly but are just as applicable to literature concerned 
with inter-related processes of green grab. The types of 
representation in question depict indigenous peoples or 
subsistence producers as universally bound to a peasant way of 
life, inherently opposed to green grabs, and unwilling to adapt 
to capitalist markets and relationships (Mamonova 2015). The 
romanticisation of resistance to green grabs, in particular, has 
been criticised as a false or overly simplistic generalisation 
of what happens when green grabs hit the ground in diverse 
geographical and historical contexts (Alsonso-Fradejas 2015; 
Hall et al. 2015; Mamonova 2015). In response, increasingly 
more critical researchers are committed to focusing on ‘the 
differentiated impacts and variegated political reactions 
to land deals’, ranging from acquiescence to demands for 
incorporation to everyday or outright resistance (Hall et al. 
2015). 
Following a return to the question of agency in broader land 
grabbing literature (Borras and Franco 2013; Hall et al. 2015), 
this article considers green grabs from a critical institutionalist 
perspective. Our approach is partially motivated by recent 
analyses that grapple with the pursuit of incorporation into green 
grabs or even acts of green grabbing on the part of indigenous 
peoples or subsistence producers stereotypically assumed to 
be diametrically opposed to or hapless victims of green grabs 
(see Gardner 2016; Astuti and McGregor 2017; Bersaglio 
2017). We also build on a recent article informed by bricolage 
that analyses changing common property arrangements in 
a community conservancy elsewhere in Laikipia (German 
et al. 2017). In building on these works, our use of bricolage 
challenges some false stereotypes about grabbers and grabbees 
and, more speciically, unsettles crude distinctions between 
acquiescence, incorporation, and resistance prevalent in 
wider debate. From a critical institutionalist perspective, the 
institutional arrangements intertwined with green grabs are the 
product of complex and sometimes contradictory interactions 
between actors at multiple scales with multiple identities 
(e.g. pastoralists and conservationists); they are not simply 
enacted from above and reacted to from below (Hall et al. 
2015). Thus, a return to the question of agency necessitates a 
return to the question of structure and, ultimately, analyses of 
green grabs informed by a critical perspective of institutions 
as political and power-laden processes. So, after saying more 
about the case study and methods behind this article, the rest 
of this article considers how green grab by bricolage ‘creates 
room for manoeuvre and new possibilities for some people but 
simultaneously reproduces and reinforces social inequalities 
for others (Cleaver 2012).
METHODOLOGY
Case study overview
Laikipia County is 869,000 ha large and located in north-
central Kenya. The county encompasses a vast plateau west 
of Mt. Kenya that once served as a prime source of grazing 
land for transhumance pastoralists across the ASALs. Prior 
to British colonisation in the late 1800s, Il Aikipiak and 
other Maasais dominated much of the plateau. However, 
as part of Britain’s efforts to transform Kenya’s highlands 
into a ‘white reserve’, thousands of pastoralists were 
moved from the Laikipia Plateau to the Southern Maasai 
Reserve near present-day Tanzania (Hughes 2006). Such 
efforts eventually led to the formalisation of a racialised 
property regime, in which ‘whites’ were permitted to hold 
land individually in the so-called white highlands whereas 
‘blacks’ were permitted to hold land collectively in ‘native 
reserves’ (Kanyinga 2009).
Current land use and tenure arrangements in Laikipia 
have been shaped by the legacies of this racialised property 
regime; especially in the county’s conservation industry. Some 
estimates suggest that as much as 40 per cent of the county (or 
382,400 ha) is owned by a white minority of the population, 
divided among 48 large-scale properties (Letai 2011, 2015). 
Forty-six of these properties are used for conservation and 
tourism and are either owned by settlers or have since been 
sold-off to international organisations like Fauna and Flora 
International or The Nature Conservancy (LWF 2012). 
Beyond the 46 properties that comprise most of the land used 
for wildlife conservation and tourism in Laikipia, 11 group 
ranches – i.e. ‘privately titled collective rangelands used for 
communal livestock production’ (Nelson 2012: 3) – owned 
by Maasai or Samburu pastoralists contribute 71,200 ha (or 7 
per cent of Laikipia) to the conservation industry in the form 
of community conservancies (Letai 2011). In this article, we 
are primarily concerned with how Laikipia’s three community 
conservancies, called Il Ngwesi, Lekurruki, and Naibunga, it 
into the countys conservation landscape.1
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Laikipia’s network of private and community conservancies 
adds up to about 365,000 ha of contiguous space for 
conservation (LWF 2012). This network provides habitat for 
a wildlife population larger than that of Amboseli, Nairobi, 
Tsavo East, and Tsavo West National Parks combined 
(Kinnaird and O’brien 2012). In addition to containing a 
large population of wildlife, the county boasts high levels of 
biodiversity – including more than 95 species of mammals, 
540 species of birds, and 87 species of amphibians and reptiles 
(LWF 2012). Laikipia is also famous for its endangered and 
critically-endangered megafauna. This includes half of Kenya’s 
black rhinoceros population and the country’s second largest 
elephant population, as well as less well- known species such 
as the reticulated giraffe (Giraffa camelopardalis reticulata), 
Grevy’s zebra (Equus grevyi), and Laikipia hartebeest (a hybrid 
of Alcelaphus buselaphus cokei and lelwel). With the exception 
of black rhinoceroses, all community conservancies in Laikipia 
provide habitat for these and other endangered species.  
Research methods
This article relies on qualitative data collected by the irst 
author on this article during 11 months of ieldwork in Kenya 
between October 2014 and June 2015, as well as during follow-
up trips in May 2016 and April and July 2017. The ieldwork 
involved ethnographic methods in case study research on 
community conservancies across Kenya’s ASALs, including 
participation in tourism activities, observation of natural 
resource management practices, key informant interviews, 
informal interviews, and document analysis. The languages 
used during the research were primarily English, Kiswahili, 
and Maa. 
In total, the irst author spent over two months participating in 
tourism activities and observing natural resource management 
practices in community conservancies. Between 2014 and 
2017, over 160 interviews were carried out with some 100 
informants and interlocutors. Participants included individuals 
from pastoralist households in community conservancies 
(representing different ages, genders, and identity groups, 
although most identiied as Maasai), administrative authorities 
in community conservancies, pastoralist civil society 
groups, biodiversity conservation organisations, and county 
governments, as well as representatives from broader 
populations of conservationists, landowners, and tourists in 
the region. The irst author also spent seven days in Kenya’s 
National Archives collecting data that added historical context 
to the ieldwork. 
Most of the data informing this article derives from 
ieldwork activities that focused on Il Ng’wesi Conservancy, 
located on the north-eastern border of Laikipia. Il Ng’wesi 
Conservancy is 9,433 ha large and has a population of 1,448 
people, most of whom identify as Maasai  the conservancys 
name refers to a sub-section of Maasai who sometimes call 
themselves Il Ng’wesi or Laikipiak in reference to one of the 
original dominant Maasai groups on the plateau (Sobania 
1993). Although Il Ng’wesi Conservancy was a focal point 
of ieldwork, general insights into community conservancies 
across Kenya’s ASALs came from research activities 
pertaining to community conservancies in the nearby counties 
of Isiolo, Marsabit, and Samburu. In what follows, we analyse 
key institutional arrangements for managing communal lands 
and natural resources in NRT conservancies; focusing on 
institutions governing revenue distribution and use, rangeland 
access and use, and conservation enterprises. 
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS IN 
COMMUNITY CONSERVANCIES 
Since being established in 2004, NRT has become one of the 
most inluential conservation organisations in Kenya. It is 
now common to hear NRT referred to as the new government 
in the north – meaning the ASALs.2 In the mid-1990s, Ian 
Craig – whose long-time settler family owned what is now a 
UNESCO World Heritage Site, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy 
(LWC) – began trying to persuade elders among pastoralist 
communities north of his family’s land to implement wildlife 
conservation and tourism initiatives on their lands. After much 
persuasion,3 Il Ng’wesi became one of the irst group ranches 
to collaborate with LWC to implement CBNRM. Soon after, 
Namunyak in Samburu County entered a similar partnership 
with LWC. Today there are 27 community conservancies 
across the ASALs, under the umbrella organisation of NRT 
(NRT 2015a).
The NRT was established to coordinate and support the 
growing number of community conservancies emerging 
through collaborative efforts between LWC and pastoralist 
communities across the ASALs (NRT 2013). The organisation 
was given a mandate to develop conservancy institutions in 
group ranches and other communal property settings, monitor 
the performance of community conservancies and provide 
advice on how to manage conservancy affairs, and raise 
funds for community conservancies while providing quality 
assurance to donors from around the world (NRT 2015b). 
This mandate was meant to ‘develop resilient community 
conservancies which transform people’s lives, secure peace 
and conserve natural resources’ (NRT 2015b: 8). Indeed, NRT 
sees itself as more than just a conservation organisation; it 
understands community conservancies as spaces that foster 
peace and stability in insecure parts of Kenya’s ASALs and that 
catalyse sustainable development among pastoralists through 
the formalisation of customary institutional arrangements for 
natural resource management (NRT 2012).  
Speciically, NRT deines a community conservancy as a 
‘community-owned and community-run institution that aims 
to improve biodiversity conservation, land management and 
the livelihoods of its constituents over a deined area of land 
traditionally owned, or used, by that constituent community’ 
(2015b: 10). Departing from the approach to establishing 
conservancies outlined in Kenya’s new Wildlife Conservation 
and Management Act – which encourages the acquisition 
of new land, or transformation of existing land, to create 
conservation areas – NRT integrates existing arrangements 
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for managing communal lands and natural resources with 
conservancy institutions (NRT 2015b). ‘In communities 
where traditional institutions (for governing resources) are 
strong and intact, conservancies must recognise these as 
the highest decision-making body and either formally or 
informally integrate them into the conservancy institution’ 
(NRT 2015b: 12). According to NRT, integration occurs best 
in settings where the Boards of Directors for community 
conservancies mirror existing leadership structures: ‘This 
streamlines community governance structures and ensures 
formal, administrative or customary institutions are represented 
on Conservancy boards’ (NRT 2015b: 12). 
To implement and fund community conservancies, 
NRT partners with international organisations such as 
USAID, The Nature Conservancy, DANIDA, and Agence 
Français de Développment (NRT 2017). NRT’s close ties 
to LWC mean that the organisation has access to a range 
of extremely wealthy patrons, including members of the 
British Royal Family. In addition to partnering with these 
rather conventional supporters of CBNRM in Africa, NRT 
has partnered with less conventional conservation supporters. 
For example, the organisation recently signed an agreement 
with Tullow Oil to establish community conservancies 
around the Anglo-Irish company’s sites of oil exploration 
and production in Turkana and West Pokot Counties. Given 
that pastoralists and conservationists have frequently found 
themselves at odds with each other throughout history, 
community conservancies implemented on land belonging 
to Borana, Gabbra, Maasai, Pokot, Rendille, Samburu, and 
Turkana pastoralists also represent unconventional alliances 
of sorts. In short, NRT’s success in expanding the scale and 
scope of its inluence has been achieved through alliances 
with conventional and non-conventional conservation actors. 
The pastoralist communities that have partnered with NRT 
have, in turn, deployed equal innovation – and perhaps more 
good faith – by pursuing unconventional alliances with the 
organisation.
The following sections outline key institutional arrangements 
for managing natural resources in community conservancies. 
They highlight speciic institutional arrangements designed 
to manage the distribution and use of revenues generated 
by community conservancies, how communal lands and 
natural resources are accessed and used in community 
conservancies, and the livelihoods of people living in 
community conservancies. This discussion recounts the main 
advantages and disadvantages of such arrangements, based 
on the experiences and perspectives of pastoralists living and 
working in community conservancies, conservancy leadership, 
and pastoralist civil society organisations working in or 
with community conservancies. The vast majority of these 
individuals identify as descendants of Il Aikipiak Maasais. The 
point of this discussion is to provide the reader with insights 
into the institutional arrangements that have been produced 
through the integration of conservation logics, markets, and 
values with existing mechanisms for managing communal 
lands and natural resources for pastoralism. 
Revenue distribution and use
The NRT recognises that the promise of institutional integration 
alone does relatively little to convince pastoralist communities 
to buy into the logic of CBNRM and to enter partnerships with 
the organisation. According to NRT, this requires the design 
and implementation of programmes that create ‘leverage for 
conservation’ (NRT 2015b: 8). 
 Leverage and support from communities for wildlife 
conservation comes from improved community attitudes 
towards conservation as a result of beneits people gain 
from conservancies, some of which are revenue and 
employment from conservancy enterprises. Conservancy 
enterprises must therefore have explicit links to the 
conservancy itself in order to create support for its 
conservation goals (NRT 2015b: 27).
In other words, NRT uses the promise of direct and indirect 
beneits to leverage pastoralist communities into partnerships 
with the organisation. Direct benefits include revenue 
generating opportunities for individuals through conservation 
enterprises, such as wildlife tourism and access to livestock 
markets and micro-finance (NRT 2015b: 35). To start, 
though, this section focuses on the indirect beneits that donor 
partnerships and wildlife tourism ventures offer in community 
conservancies through revenue generation and distribution for 
community development initiatives.  
While trying to ensure that pastoralist communities retain 
autonomy and ownership over communal lands and natural 
resources and derive benefits from conservation, NRT 
transforms existing community-level governance bodies 
– including customary councils of elders – into Boards of 
Directors. Boards consist of 12 elected representatives from 
pastoralist communities, county governments, Kenya Wildlife 
Service (KWS), private investors, and NRT. Each board member 
is elected by pastoralist communities for a three-year term and is 
eligible to run for two consecutive terms. Boards of Directors are 
responsible for ensuring that revenues generated from wildlife 
conservation and tourism activities are distributed throughout 
respective communities according to Beneit Distribution Plans. 
These plans outline if and how revenues are used to beneit 
communities by funding education and healthcare initiatives, 
infrastructure development, or sanitation and water programmes, 
for example. Under NRT, 40 per cent of revenues generated 
by community conservancies are reinvested in conservancy 
operations and the remaining 60 per cent allocated for 
community development. On an average, NRT provides 80 per 
cent of the total income generated by conservancies annually.
NRT’s logic of using opportunities for community 
development to leverage pastoralist communities into 
CBNRM arrangements has proven to be effective. Prior to 
the implementation of community conservancies, very few 
people from pastoralist communities across Kenya’s ASALs 
received a formal education. As a crude illustration of this, 
even until 2013, only 13.9 per cent of people in Laikipia had 
obtained a secondary education (KNBS-SID 2013). To access 
health services, moreover, most people had to travel long 
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distances on bicycle or by foot. Even then, accessible services 
were limited and of poor quality. A deinitive lack of good 
quality roads across Kenya’s ASALs also made the outcomes 
of medical emergencies grave – including childbirth – and 
complicated simple feats like transporting livestock to markets. 
Lastly, limited access to education and health services was 
compounded by a deinitive lack of infrastructure in pastoralist 
communities. In this regard, CBNRM has enabled some people 
in some communities to have their citizenship rights fulilled 
through partnerships with NRT in a context where local and 
national governments had largely neglected to fulill such rights 
(Funder and Marani 2015). 
Interlocutors in Il Ng’wesi and other community conservancies 
described access to education and health services, and to improved 
infrastructure, as the most important thing CBNRM has done 
for pastoralists – as ‘the number one beneit of conservation’4 
– along with access to improved security services. While 
expressing gratitude to donors and tourists for helping pastoralist 
communities generate revenues for community development, 
many informants and interlocutors are simultaneously discontent 
with the fact that CBNRM has left them dependent on foreign 
actors for their wellbeing.5 For pastoralist rights advocates, 
especially, this paternalistic dependency is seen as a form of 
neo-colonialism – as ‘Colonialism 2.0’, as one pastoralist rights 
activist stated.6 This notion of dependency stems largely from the 
fact that wildlife tourism has failed to live up to its promise as a 
way for pastoralists to generate and control their own revenues 
for community development.
Although Il Ng’wesi enjoys ‘pride of ownership’ over its eco-
lodge (NRT 2015b), a competitive and ickle tourism market, 
coupled with tourists latent prejudices against seeing livestock 
in conservation areas, have undermined its promise as a tool 
for liberating the Il Ng’wesi community from poverty and 
under-development. For example, an outbreak of Ebola as far 
away as Guinea might cause tourists booked at the eco-lodge 
to cancel reservations for refunds. This happened during the 
tourism high season in 2015, causing the Board of Directors 
to temporarily close the eco-lodge due to lack of business. 
The eco-lodge was closed again for part of 2016 and, amid 
violent conlicts between migrant pastoralists and conservancy 
personnel in Il Ng’wesi and Laikipia, the eco-lodge was 
closed for part of the 2017 high season as well due to safety 
concerns.7 In addition to the various external factors that make 
international tourism an unreliable source of income, tourists 
are inluenced by prejudices that might deter them from going 
on safari in community conservancies in the irst place. Safari 
guides working in community conservancies explained to the 
irst author on this article that it is common for tourists to lose 
their tempers at the sight of domestic livestock in conservancies: 
‘I didn’t come all this way to look at cows!’, a safari guide 
recalled one angry tourist shouting angrily during a game 
drive.8 In another instance, a tourist at at a private conservancy 
elsewhere in Laikipia exclaimed to the irst author, ‘You went 
to Il Ng’wesi? There’s nothing but a lot of dik-dik up there!’9 
With such factors in mind, wildlife tourism has proven 
to be less proitable than other conservation enterprises in 
community conservancies. In 2014, for example, wildlife 
tourism injected $468,000 into community conservancies 
(NRT 2015a). This is less than the $789,295 brought into 
the conservancies via cattle and handicraft sales combined, 
which amounts to $684,188 and $105,107 respectively (NRT 
2015a). For such reasons, creating institutional mechanisms 
for Boards of Directors to control the distribution and use of 
revenues generated from wildlife tourism may do relatively 
little to ensure the autonomy of pastoralist communities, 
leaving them dependent on external interventions and donor 
support to deliver the promises used to leverage communities 
into partnerships with NRT in the irst place.  
Rangeland access and use 
Improving the condition of communal lands and natural 
resources among pastoralist communities and securing their 
access to such resources is another key point of leverage that the 
NRT uses to incentivise pastoralists to implement community 
conservancies on their land (NRT 2015b). As indicated, the 
changing landscape of pastoralism across Kenya’s ASALs 
has forced individuals and groups to adapt their livelihoods 
– for example, by pursuing new arrangements for accessing 
and using communal lands and natural resources or new 
opportunities for livelihood diversiication. In exploiting 
this opportunity to create leverage for conservation among 
pastoralists, NRT alters existing approaches to rangeland 
management and introduces new mechanisms for securing 
communal lands and natural resources when partnering with 
pastoralist communities.  
For example, NRT facilitates training and other logistical 
support for wildlife rangers in community conservancies to 
secure space for conservation in the ASALs. Wildlife rangers 
are paramilitary forces comprised of both permanent oficers 
stationed in community conservancies and mobile units 
specialised in deterring wildlife offences, such as illegal 
hunting. Typically, wildlife rangers are also members of the 
Kenya Police Reserve (KPR) in their respective communities 
and, therefore, tend to already be residents in the community 
conservancies where they are employed. Wildlife rangers 
are paramilitary forces deployed to enforce conservancy 
boundaries and regulations, mediating access to natural 
resources for pastoralists during times of dearth and plenty. 
However, wildlife rangers also provide general security services 
to people living in community conservancies – acting as irst 
responders to cattle raids, livestock thefts, and other emergency 
situations. In other words, community conservancies provide 
pastoralists access to new mechanisms and procedures that 
enable to them forcefully defend their territory.  
To carry out their conservation mandate and provide security 
services in community conservancies, wildlife rangers are 
granted access to military intelligence, technology, and 
weapons. In partnership with KWS and KPR, wildlife rangers 
also receive special training in combatting wildlife crimes, 
collecting intelligence, and enforcing conservancy regulations. 
It is worth noting that Kenya’s new WCMA increases the 
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scope and punishment of wildlife offences, which wildlife 
rangers have the authority to enforce in collaboration with 
the national government. In securing space for conservation 
across Kenya’s ASALs, and acting as security agents in 
under-serviced areas, wildlife rangers also play a vital role 
in managing how communal lands and natural resources are 
accessed and used. 
Speciically, wildlife rangers monitor access to natural 
resources among community members and regulate natural 
resource uses allowed or disallowed by Grazing Coordinators 
and Grazing Committees that might already exist at the 
community level – group ranches tend to already have such 
individuals and institutions in place before community 
conservancies are implemented. The NRT’s current approach 
to managing communal lands and natural resources for shared 
use is known as ‘holistic rangeland management’. Holistic 
rangeland management is said to combine customary grazing 
practices with modern techniques (LWF 2017). In simple terms, 
it involves grazing livestock in tightly clustered groups in 
designated grazing blocks in community conservancies: ‘when 
huddled close to one another the animals act as a “bulldozer” 
breaking the ground and allowing for water and nutrient low, 
whilst at the same time they implant seeds and add fertilizer’ 
(LWF 2017). Grazing blocks are rotated to distribute nutrients 
from livestock dung and other beneicial aspects of their 
behaviour throughout community conservancies, enabling 
livestock to play a role in regenerating plants for shared use. 
While the practices of holistic rangeland management relect 
centuries of customary adaptation by pastoralists in the ASALs, 
new discourses, logics, and technologies are said to add a 
modern element to this centuries-old approach to managing 
communal lands and natural resources.  
Next to access to social services and infrastructure, 
interlocutors in community conservancies cite security as 
the most important beneit that CBNRM has brought to their 
communities. At the same time, however, the proliferation 
of paramilitary personnel and military grade weapons 
across Kenya’s ASALs is understood by many informants 
to be aggravating tensions over communal lands and natural 
resources and provoking conlicts with deadly outcomes. 
For example, in June 2015, wildlife rangers at Il Ng’wesi 
exchanged ire with Samburu pastoralists that had entered the 
conservancy to graze and water their livestock. The conlict 
left six people dead, including two Il Ng’wesi members. 
During a similar incident in 2017, tourists had to be evacuated 
from the eco-lodge in a helicopter supplied by LWC.10 Such 
conlicts are not new across Kenya’s ASALs, but CBNRM 
does provide a new justiication for the use of lethal violence 
to defend territory. One NRT document reports that there were 
71 incidents of cattle rustling in its conservancies, as well 
as 17 human deaths due to insecurity in 2014 (NRT 2015a). 
Interestingly, both statistics increased from 2013 and correlate 
with a signiicant decrease in the number of elephants killed 
illegally in community conservancies.
Beyond the violence associated with securing communal 
lands and natural resources for conservation across Kenya’s 
ASALs, the rangeland management practices enforced with 
the assistance of wildlife rangers have led to new forms of 
exclusion within community conservancies. Accordingly, it 
is relatively common to observe – or hear about – pastoralists 
in community conservancies disregarding conservancy 
bylaws and watering and grazing their livestock in wildlife 
areas.11 Moreover, when asked about holistic rangeland 
management, interlocutors often reply with statements that 
slander or taunt NRT: ‘Ha! Holistic what? We have been 
doing that for centuries.12 Holistic rangeland management is 
widely perceived as a co-optation of customary institutions 
that legitimates the exclusion of pastoralists from communal 
lands and natural resources that are supposed to be owned and 
managed by them under NRT. For such reasons, pastoralist 
rights activists outside community conservancies typically 
refer to community conservancies as a form of ‘land grab’ 
(which we in turn call green grab), to hybrid institutions as 
‘colonialism’, and to NRT as ‘Lords of Impunity’.13 Despite 
NRT’s insistence that community conservancies are spaces 
that foster peace and stability in insecure parts of the ASALs, 
the organisation’s approach to managing rangeland access and 
use is perceived as intensifying conlict over communal lands 
and natural resources and introducing new forms of exclusion 
into pastoralist communities.  
Conservation enterprises 
In creating leverage for conservation through income generating 
or enhancing opportunities, NRT focuses on developing wildlife 
tourism in community conservancies and on enhancing access 
to markets and micro-inance for existing livelihoods. To begin 
with, NRT’s approach to wildlife tourism mainly involves 
facilitating investment in safari camps and lodges through 
a range of ownership, management, and beneit distribution 
arrangements. Il Ng’wesi, for example, is owned and operated 
by Il Ng’wesi members – members that range from local 
politicians to individuals with diverse livelihood portfolios 
to strictly pastoralist households comprised of men and 
women. The NRT suggests that this ownership model affords 
communities the greatest degree of autonomy over decisions 
related to wildlife tourism and the revenues it generates. 
However, tourism ventures might also be community-owned 
but privately managed, such as Tassia in Lekurruki. In 
some cases, lodges are both owned and operated by private 
companies. The NRT sees itself as playing a mediating role of 
an ‘honest broker’ in its efforts to foster community-private 
sector partnerships in community conservancies while ensuring 
transparency and consensus in negotiations (NRT 2015b). As 
the advantages and disadvantages of wildlife tourism have 
already been discussed in relation to the management of 
revenue distribution and use in community conservancies, this 
section focuses on the management of conservation enterprises 
designed to generate income and livelihood opportunities for 
pastoralists through CBNRM.
Beyond mediating investments in wildlife tourism, 
NRT facilitates access to cattle markets for pastoralists in 
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community conservancies through a for-proit division of 
the organisation called NRT-Trading (NRT-T). As many 
community conservancies have yet to develop wildlife tourism 
ventures – and because wildlife tourism has not proven to 
be all that successful in generating revenues in community 
conservancies – NRT’s cattle marketing initiative has become 
one of the more beneicial aspects of CBNRM for communities. 
Through this programme, NRT-T purchases cattle from 
pastoralists in community conservancies, ‘fattens them’ on 
settler-owned ranches and conservancies,14 and then sells them 
for slaughter about 18 months after purchase. NRT’s cattle 
marketing initiative is also praised for offering ‘more than fair’ 
prices for cattle.15 For example, a cow that might typically be 
sold for $221 at the local market might be bought by NRT-T 
for $288.16 Through this exchange, the seller is required to 
pay a levy to their respective conservancy, as is NRT-T. This 
levy provides conservancies with a small, additional source 
of income. The income generated by NRT-T through its cattle 
sales are reinvested back into the organisation. 
Another key way that NRT is investing in conservation 
enterprises is by facilitating ‘financial literacy’ training, 
micro-credit, and access to markets for beadwork and other 
handicrafts (NRT 2015a, 2015b). These interrelated initiatives 
primarily target women, whereas employment in tourism and 
cattle sales target men. Initially, NRT provided inancial and 
business training to women in community conservancies. 
Upon completing the training, participants became eligible to 
apply for small loans. According to NRT, 737 women received 
training in inancial literacy, 253 women received training in 
business development, and 98 women were ultimately able 
to access $17,280 in micro-credit in 2014 (NRT 2015a). On 
average, each woman received $176 in micro-credit, but loans 
were only granted to women in 3 community conservancies 
(NRT 2015a). Since 2011, funding for micro-credit has 
declined, as NRT transitions towards mediating access to 
handicraft markets through NRT-T. 
Although small loans were meant to help women kick-start 
handicraft businesses that sold merchandise to tourists visiting 
community conservancies, NRT’s most recent programme 
provides women access to handicraft markets through NRT-T 
and its afiliated organisation, Beadworks. This programme is 
like NRT’s cattle marketing initiative: women purchase raw 
materials at cost from NRT-T, which they use to make beaded 
decorations and jewelry. Participants in the programme then 
sell their goods back to NRT-T via monthly markets, where they 
get paid, receive feedback on the quality of their goods, and in 
turn purchase materials for new merchandise. NRT carries out 
quality control, packaging, and markets the goods to clients in 
Kenya and around the world (NRT 2015b).
Individuals who have been granted access to new markets 
and valuations for cultural products (i.e. cattle, beads, 
etc.) speak favourably about NRT-T’s efforts to boost their 
livelihoods. Yet they are quick to downplay the impacts such 
programmes have on their lives, let alone in wider society. 
For example, access to cattle markets through NRT-T is partly 
determined by the performance of community conservancies. 
In other words, NRT-T selects who it purchases cattle from 
based on the conservation and governance performance of 
the community conservancies in which potential beneiciaries 
reside. Additionally, each conservancy is allocated a 
limited number of cattle that they can sell to NRT-T and the 
organisation does not purchase cattle on a regular basis. One 
pastoralist from Il Ng’wesi explained that, ‘if NRT buys a cow 
from you today, you might not see them again for one or one 
and a half years.17 Moreover, NRT-T will only purchase cattle 
from pastoralists, even though sheep and goats are proliic in 
community conservancies.
Women express similar critiques of NRT-T’s handicraft 
programme. Because the flow of tourists to community 
conservancies is inconsistent and unpredictable, producing 
goods for the tourist market has not proven to be proitable. 
Additionally, demand for handicrafts does not match the 
number of women participating in NRT programmes. To 
illustrate this point, an informant belonging to one women’s 
group in Il Ng’wesi explained that, should the conservancy 
receive an order for 150 belts, each women’s group in the 
community might only end up making about 20 belts. A 
typical group may have 25-30 members, all of whom share 
in the proit of the goods they produce and sell.18 ‘We can 
make them, we just can’t succeed. We don’t have the market’, 
she said.19 An informant from a women’s rights organisation 
added that it is problematic to conine women’s contributions 
to conservation to handicraft-making, ‘as if that’s all they can 
do.20 Comparatively, women remain under-represented in 
leadership positions and decision-making processes within 
community conservancies.21 Such insights suggest that 
NRT’s efforts to integrate informal, customary livelihoods 
with CBNRM through conservation enterprises has failed to 
convince pastoralists that their bargain with NRT is going to 
deliver the results they were initially promised. 
Before concluding, the next section returns to the concept of 
bricolage to expound on how power operates in and through the 
types of community conservancy institutions discussed above 
to produce undesired or unintended outcomes. In doing so, it 
further clariies how institutions mediate the interface between 
individual behavior and society to produce outcomes that 
contradict the very ideas and aspirations of CBNRM (Cleaver 
2002). Focusing on the institutional interface of agency and 
structure, pastoralists need not be understood as either hapless 
victims acted on from above or autonomous actors reacting 
from below, but as political agents embedded in contradictory 
rules and practices of green grabs. 
THE INSTITUTIONAL WORKINGS OF POWER 
IN COMMUNITY CONSERVANCIES
To begin, a bricolage perspective demands consideration 
for processes through which some pastoralist communities 
have pursued unconventional partnerships with NRT while 
simultaneously adapting CBNRM arrangements to better 
serve their desires, interests, and needs. Through this lens, 
community conservancies are outcomes of pragmatic political 
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manoeuvres on the part of pastoralists and conservationists 
alike – manoeuvres that correspond with the reconiguration of 
ideologies of nature, however slight. Through this manoeuvring 
and reconfiguration, old institutional arrangements are 
modiied and new ones are invented; institutional mechanisms 
of diverse origins are recycled and repurposed; and adapted 
institutions are imbued with meaning and authority through the 
everyday challenges they respond to and the actions in which 
they are embedded (Cleaver and De Koning 2015). 
The hybrid arrangements resulting from bricolage are also 
embedded in diverse cultures and forms of social organisation 
that underpin rural society. From NRT’s perspective, for 
community conservancies to function effectively in practice, 
conservation logics, markets, and values need to become 
rooted in the established rules and practices that organise 
everyday life among pastoralist communities. Accordingly, 
NRT emphasises working through existing institutional 
arrangements for managing natural resources rather than 
entirely replacing them – here it is worth emphasising that 
existing institutional arrangements have likely already been 
adapted, borrowed, and hybridised, such as arrangements 
for managing group ranches (German et al. 2017). This 
is evident in the emphasis that NRT places on creating 
leverage for conservation among pastoralist communities 
by developing appropriate conservation enterprises. For 
example, by designing institutions that enable livestock and 
handicraft producers in community conservancies to beneit 
from conservation, however marginally, NRT seeks to blend 
customary livelihood practices with market-based approaches 
to conservation and vice versa. In this example, pastoralists 
can be understood as shaping new institutional arrangements in 
community conservancies unconsciously through the everyday 
normative actions that underpin their livelihoods. Holistic 
rangeland management is another example of how pastoralists 
have shaped institutional arrangements in community 
conservancies and have participated in adapting conservancy 
institutions to meet the needs of livestock and wildlife. As NRT 
explains (2015b: 12), community conservancies ‘build on these 
traditional institutions and their governance structures and land 
management practices are a mix of formal and customary’. 
From this perspective, bricolage is an adaptive and dynamic 
process; but it also has limitations.  
As existing leadership structures and institutional 
arrangements are reworked in community conservancies 
to produce outcomes like holistic rangeland management, 
bricoleurs engage in adaptive, innovative, and pragmatic 
courses of action. Yet they are also conined to act within 
the literal and igurative constraints imposed on them by the 
environment, society, and related power relationships. As 
Levi-Strauss (1962) famously remarked, a bricoleur might 
make a lampshade out of an umbrella stand but the same 
umbrella stand cannot be made into a space shuttle. Not only 
would a bricoleur face physical limitations in trying to turn 
an umbrella into a space shuttle, they might also be subjected 
to societal pressures or sanctions that dissuade them from 
pursuing such a foolish project in the irst place. In the case 
of community conservancies, it is instructive to relect on the 
exercise of agency by groups of women. Whilst women can 
apparently form associations and beneit from bead-making 
enterprises through NRT-T, it is probable that such agency 
might not extend to them becoming members of Board of 
Directors – certainly not a dominant social category among 
Boards of Directors. Moreover, by engaging with community 
conservancies through ‘traditional’ women’s livelihood 
activities, which are less income generating and less central to 
conservation goals than those typically performed by men (e.g. 
cattle herding), they are arguably made complicit in reinforcing 
their own subordination through participation in community 
conservancy institutions. In this regard, multiple existing 
institutions and diffuse sources of power place tangible limits 
on processes of bricolage and the range of possible outcomes 
associated with it (Sehring 2009; Petursson and Vedeld 2015). 
The resulting patchwork of institutions that ends up 
being produced through bricolage serves multiple functions 
(Cleaver and De Koning 2015). For example, new institutional 
arrangements for managing access and use of natural resources 
in community conservancies also serve as emergency response 
mechanisms and as mechanisms for defending community-
owned land from trespassers. Additionally, although NRT-T’s 
livestock marketing programme serves as a new mechanism 
by which pastoralists can access cattle markets, the imposition 
and collection of an exchange levy on cattle purchases in 
community conservancies generates revenue for conservation 
activities – at least in principle. Moreover, by making access to 
cattle markets contingent on the conservation performance of 
communities, the livestock marketing programme serves as a 
mechanism that incentivises or places pressure on pastoralists 
to uphold their respective community’s new conservation 
mandate. In such ways, multi-functional institutional 
arrangements formed through bricolage are adaptive responses 
to particular social environments, but also serve to embed and 
extend the reach of the powerful across different domains of 
action. 
Additionally, a bricolage lens suggests that multifunctional 
institutional arrangements need to be seen to it with established 
rules and practices if they are to be accepted and ascribed 
meaning and authority. This is exempliied by the function 
of local Boards of Directors in community conservancies, 
which are designed to mirror existing leadership structures 
and decision-making processes among different pastoralist 
communities. The subtle process of achieving it between 
old and new institutional arrangements – of ‘naturalisation’ 
(Douglas 1987) – is facilitated by calls on imagined or real 
traditions; new symbols, discourses, and power relationships; 
and cultural, normative, or cosmological notions of right and 
wrong (Cleaver and De Koning 2015: 5). Such calls relect 
in one claim made by a safari guide at Il Ng’wesi lodge, who 
explained that ‘conservancies allow us to milk cattle with 
one hand and wildlife with the other.22 The use of ‘milk’ 
in this statement serves to legitimise Il Ng’wesi’s pursuit of 
CBNRM, symbolising the supposed centrality of pastoralism 
in community conservancies by linking a fundamental 
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subsistence practice (i.e. milking cattle) with the life-sustaining 
potential of conservation. 
Expounding on different forms of bricolage, and the variable 
actions of bricoleurs, De Koning and Cleaver (2012) identify 
three processes that occur when customary and informal 
institutions encounter new and formal ones in settings like 
community conservancies: aggregation, alteration, and 
articulation. Aggregation refers to the creative combination of 
introduced institutions with existing institutional mechanisms 
and normative actions, leading to hybrid institutional 
arrangements. Holistic rangeland management is an example 
of aggregation, as it allows pastoralists in community 
conservancies to graze and water cattle in wildlife areas – albeit 
in a closely regulated manner – while contributing positively 
to local ecosystems from NRT’s perspective. Alteration refers 
to the ongoing adjusting and adapting of institutions to make 
them better it existing livelihood practices or notions of identity. 
Examples of alteration in community conservancies include 
mechanisms that allow wildlife rangers to act as irst responders 
in emergencies, or as paramilitary forces that defend territory, 
rather than simply as wildlife oficers. Finally, articulation refers 
to the assertion of culture, identity, or tradition in resistance to 
new hybrid institutional arrangements. Examples of articulation 
in community conservancies often include acts of everyday 
resistance – such as breaking into wildlife areas at night to graze 
and water livestock or slandering NRT. More broadly, everyday 
resistance refers to ‘the ordinary weapons of relatively powerless 
groups: foot dragging, dissimulation, false compliance, pilfering, 
feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage, and so on’ (Scott 
1985: 29).  Consideration of bricolage practices associated with 
naturalisation, and of articulation speciically, leads to further 
relection on the limitations and possibilities of human agency 
in settings like CBNRM. 
Although bricoleurs participate in shaping institutional 
arrangements through conscious and unconscious actions, 
previous sections indicate that bricolage remains an 
authoritative process that is shaped by historical patterns 
of access and accumulation and by corresponding power 
relationships among bricoleurs in present-day Kenya. Working 
visibly and invisibly through taken-for-granted social orders 
(Lukes 2005), power ‘shapes processes of bricolage through 
public decision-making, in everyday social interactions, and 
through broader social-structural factors’ (Cleaver et al. 2013: 
175). For example, a widespread lack of familiarity with the 
economic principles of conservation among pastoralists means 
that people are inherently disadvantaged in public decision-
making processes that impact their lives in community 
conservancies  even though NRT prioritises the design of 
democratic and transparent institutions that are said to protect 
the autonomy and ownership pastoralist communities have 
over communal lands and natural resources. For the sake of 
illustration, a member of Il Ng’wesi leadership described 
how the Board of Directors failed to adequately inform the 
community about the implications of value deprecation during 
one AGM, when trying to achieve a consensus on the fate of 
the conservancy’s Land Cruisers: ‘We tried to explain the idea 
of value depreciation to the community during a recent AGM. 
They simply could not understand it. They asked, “Does the 
Land Cruiser still work? Do the wheels still spin? Then how 
can it depreciate?”’23 
Indeed, consideration for everyday social interactions in 
community conservancies and for broader social structures 
reveals how power works in and through hybrid institutions 
to reproduce and reinforce inequality; even in the context 
of institutional arrangements considered to be adaptive, 
innovative, and progressive. For example, foreign tourists’ 
cultural biases against seeing livestock in wildlife areas while 
on safari dissuades some from spending time and money 
in community conservancies and, as such, serves as one 
bench mark against which NRT rewards or punishes partner 
communities. In broader terms, the legacies of a racialised 
property regime contribute to the fact that settler landowners 
have the privilege and power to devise mechanisms for 
leveraging pastoralist communities into conservation in the 
irst place – a point that should not be understated in Laikipia 
(see Mbaria and Ogada 2016; McIntosh 2016; Bersaglio 2017). 
Although power works subtly through public-decision making 
processes and everyday social interactions in community 
conservancies, as well as through broader social structures, 
its effects place real and observable constraints on the 
opportunities available to pastoralist communities to adapt, 
negotiate, and resist hybrid institutional arrangements for 
managing communal lands and natural resources (Giddens 
1984; Rabe and Saunders 2013; Ojha et al. 2016). 
CONCLUSION
Building on recent critical engagement with the expansion of 
community conservancies across Kenya’s ASALs, this article 
reframes the refurbishment and rearrangement of pastoralist 
institutions governing communal lands and natural resources 
to align with the ideas and aspirations of CBNRM as a form 
of green grab. Speciically, our analysis and discussion reveal 
the subtle ways that green grabs occur through processes 
of bricolage: the conscious and unconscious reshaping of 
institutional arrangements for managing communal lands and 
natural resources by bricoleurs, who make use of whatever 
resources and tools happen to be at their disposal (Cleaver 
2012). In the case of Il Ng’wesi and other community 
conservancies across Kenya’s ASALs, NRT policies and 
programmes represent a toolkit containing many of the 
resources available to transhumance pastoralists in the region. 
By relaying contextual insights offered by informants and 
interlocutors in Kenya, our empirical contribution offers 
glimpses into some of the undesired and unintended outcomes 
of community conservancies. Doing so also provides evidence 
of how green grabs work in and through established rules and 
practices governing communal lands and natural resources, as 
well as how the outcomes of such phenomena relect historical 
patterns of access and accumulation in Laikipia speciically – a 
stronghold of settler society in Kenya (see Mbaria and Ogada 
2016; McIntosh 2016; Bersaglio 2017). 
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The article’s main theoretical contribution derives from its 
engagement with the question of agency in wider debate on land 
grabs and, by implication, green grabs (see Borras and Franco 
2013; Hall et al. 2015). We suggest that a return to the question 
of agency should occur in tandem with nuanced consideration 
for the structures that shape individual behaviours and, in turn, 
limit the range of outcomes possible through CBNRM. In 
framing our analysis, we bring green grabbing literature into 
conversation with that on critical institutionalism to show how 
institutions mediate complex and sometimes contradictory 
interactions between actors at multiple scales with multiple 
identities to produce green grabs. Speciically, we depart from 
linear conceptions of power that frame green grabs as enacted 
from above and reacted to from below in pursuit of a more 
diffuse understanding of power that ultimately complicates 
false stereotypes of grabbers and grabbees and unsettles 
crude distinctions between acquiescence, incorporation, and 
resistance (see Gardner 2016; Astuti and McGregor 2017; 
Bersaglio 2017). Our analysis and discussion begin to show 
how green grabs occur through bricolage, which involves inter-
related processes of aggregation, alteration, and articulation 
among diverse individuals and groups of bricoleurs. In this 
regard, green grab by bricolage produces contradictory 
institutional spaces animated by the promise of adaptation, 
collaboration, and ingenuity, but constrained by historically 
unequal patterns of access, accumulation, and domination 
between bricoleurs.
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NOTES
1 Naibunga Conservancy is a collection of nine group ranches: 
Koija, Il Motiok, Tie Mamut, Kijabe, Nkiloriti, Musul, Il Polei, 
Munishoi and Morupusi.  
2 Interviews with pastoralist civil society organisations on  May 
21, 2016 and  July 19, 2017. 
3 Interview with member of Il Ng’wesi leadership on  February 
18, 2015. 
4 Interviews in Il Ng’wesi between February 16–20, 2015. 
5 Interviews in Il Ngwesi and with pastoralist civil society 
organisations between February 16–20, 2015 and on  May 18, 
2016 and  May 21, 2016. 
6 Interview with pastoralist civil society organisation on  May 21, 
2016.  
7 Interview with safari guide at Il Ng’wesi on July 19, 2017.  
8 Interview with safari guide at Il Ng’wesi on  February 19, 2015. 
9 Interview with tourist to Il Ng’wesi (at another location) on 
April 19, 2015. 
10 Interview with member of Il Ng’wesi leadership on  July 19, 
2017.
11 Interviews and observations in Il Ng’wesi between February 
16–20, 2015. 
12 Interview with pastoralist women’s civil society organisation 
on  May 18, 2016. 
13 Interviews with pastoralist civil society organisations on  May 
18, 2016 and  May 21, 2016.
14 Interview with pastoralist from Il Ng’wesi on  May 19, 2016.  
15 Interview with pastoralist from Il Ng’wesi  May 19, 2016.
16 These numbers were given as an illustration during an interview 
and do not necessarily relect the actual exchange value of cattle 
in the NRT-T’s livestock marketing programme. 
17 Interview with pastoralist from Il Ng’wesi on  May 19, 2016. 
18 Interview with member of women’s group in Il Ng’wesi on  May 
5, 2015.
19 Interview with member of women’s group in Il Ng’wesi on  May 
5, 2015.
20 Interview with pastoralist women’s civil society organisation 
on  May 18, 2016.
21 Interview with member of women’s group in Il Ng’wesi on May 
5, 2015.
22 Interview with safari guide at Il Ng’wesi on  February 18, 2015. 
23 Interview with member of Il Ng’wesi leadership on  February 
19, 2015.
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